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Objective: To assess effects of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) and the four individual state
settlements on tobacco company decisions and performance.
Design: 10-K reports filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, firm and daily data from the
Center for Research in Security Prices, stock price indices, market share and advertising data, cigarette
export and domestic consumption data, and newspaper articles were used to assess changes before
(1990–98) and after (1999–2002) the MSA was implemented.
Subjects: Five major tobacco manufacturers in the USA.
Main outcome measures: Stockholder returns, operating performance of defendant companies, exports,
market share of the original participants in the MSA, and advertising/promotion expenditures.
Results: Returns to investments in the tobacco industry exceeded returns from investments in securities of
other companies, using each of four indexes as comparators. Domestic tobacco revenues increased during
1999–2002 from pre-MSA levels. Profits from domestic sales rose from levels prevailing immediately
before the MSA. There is no indication that the MSA caused an increase in tobacco exports. Total market
share of the original participating manufacturers in the MSA decreased. Total advertising expenditures by
the tobacco companies increased at a higher rate than the 1990–98 trend during 1999–2002, but total
advertising expenditures net of spending on coupons and promotions decreased.
Conclusion: The experience during the post-MSA period demonstrates that the MSA did no major harm to
the companies. Some features of the MSA appear to have increased company value and profitability.
O
n 23 November 1998, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds,
Lorillard (unit of Loews), and Brown & Williamson
(US subsidiary of British American Tobacco), and 46
state attorneys general signed a $206 billion agreement,
known as the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).1 Four
states were not part of the MSA and settled separately with
the tobacco companies before the agreement. A fifth
company, Liggett (unit of Vector Group), eventually signed
onto the MSA.
The MSA and the individual settlements imposed financial
penalties in the form of annual payments to states and
restrictions on behaviour. State, and some local, governments
received compensation for past losses stemming from
treatment of tobacco related diseases through their
Medicaid programs. However, neither the federal government
nor persons with tobacco related diseases were compensated
by the MSA. Like most litigation, the states settled with the
tobacco companies. Recipients of MSA funds were not
required to spend the money in particular ways.2–4
To the extent that actions of tobacco companies harmed
the states, ultimate responsibility for past behaviour should
fall on shareholders and on boards to which they delegated
decision making responsibility. However, since the settlement
payments were based on tobacco company sales rather than
as a lump sum obligation, which would have been borne by
shareholders, the payment schedule was structured like a per
unit excise tax imposed on a commodity. Conceptually, such
a tax is shifted to consumers of the product, and when the
market structure is oligopolistic, as is the tobacco industry,
there may be an overshifting of the tax.5–7 Imposition of an
excise tax-like payment may facilitate collusion in price
among competing companies.8 Thus, profitability may
increase after the tax is imposed. In the month following
passage of the MSA alone, tobacco retail prices rose by 18.8%
per pack.9
Shifts into areas not covered by the litigation also represent
unintended, adverse side effects. By applying only to US
sales, and by excluding coverage of production for export
sales, thus lowering the cost to the companies of exported
cigarettes relative to cigarettes produced for domestic
consumption, the MSA may have provided an incentive for
participating firms to increase their exports, using excess
existing capacity for production of exports in the face of
declining domestic demand. The only stated requirement in
the MSA for exports was the use of a distinguishing package
from cigarettes sold in the USA.1
Those firms that chose not to join the MSA (non-
participating manufacturers or NPMs) were required to place
funds in state escrow accounts in reserve for future law-
suits,1 3 a provision designed to protect the participating firms
and to provide an incentive for manufacturers to join the
agreement. Provisions were included to discourage advertis-
ing and promotions aimed at youths. Other penalties
included bad publicity from agreeing to settlement with the
state attorneys general, both initially, and on an ongoing
basis, and anti-tobacco advertisements sponsored by the
American Legacy Foundation from MSA funds.
Our study assessed effects of the MSA and the four
individual settlements on stockholder returns, operating
performance of the defendant companies, growth of exports,
impact on market share of the original manufacturers, and
advertising expenditures.
Abbreviations: CPI, Consumer Price Index, CRSP, Center for Research
in Security Prices; MSA, Master Settlement Agreement; NPMs, non-
participating manufacturers; OPMs, original participating
manufacturers; SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission; SIC,
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METHODS
Financial data used to compute stock returns and investment
value for each company were accessed from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) ‘‘Monthly Stocks’’ and
‘‘Daily Stocks’’ databases.10 CRSP stock return data include
dividends, splits, and other distributions. We used all of the
stock tickers assigned to tobacco manufacturers from 1990–
2002: Philip Morris (MO), Loews (LTR, CG), Vector Group
(VGR, BGL, LIG), RJ Reynolds (RJR, RN), and British
American Tobacco (BTI). When tobacco manufacturers
split from parent companies (RJR from RJR Nabisco and
CG from Loews), we used the stock ticker for tobacco
manufacturing.
We calculated aggregate market returns for tobacco
companies and various indices from January 1990 to
December 2002, based on an initial investment of $100,
and alternatively, in 1999–2002. We created a comparative
index based on returns from each other industry that the
cigarette companies were involved in, a market capitalization
weighted industry return, using all companies listed under
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code for that
industry. The other industries most similar to tobacco were:
food (SIC 2020, 2022, 2033, 2052, 2099, and 2651), beer
(2082), spirits (2085), oil (1381 and 1389), financial (6331),
hotel (7011 and 7832), watches (3873), and real estate
(6211). The overall return for all other industries was
calculated as a weighted average using the revenue shares
of the industry to the cigarette industry as weights.
Comparisons were also performed with other indices: S&P
500; a total index that encompasses the NASDAQ, AMEX,
and NYSE; and the Russell 2000 (small cap index).
The tobacco industry investment value was weighted by
each company’s percentage of total tobacco industry market
value in 1990. When calculating the aggregate market return
for RJ Reynolds, we started with a $100 investment in March
1991 due to the earlier leveraged buy out of the company by
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, which resulted in RJ Reynolds not
being publicly traded in 1990 and early 1991.
Other data sources were newspaper articles, company 10-K
reports submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), market share data from The Maxwell
Report (Tobacco Reporter), policy reports from the US
Department of Agriculture (exports) and the Federal Trade
Commission (advertising), and review of journal articles.
Using 10-K report data, we assessed profit and revenues in
2002 dollars for the domestic tobacco segment of Philip
Morris and RJ Reynolds. Since Lorillard and Liggett did not
have substantial foreign operations, we used the total tobacco
segment financial data. We could not analyse revenue and
profit for Brown & Williamson because the parent company,
British American Tobacco, did not submit 10-K reports.
To calculate domestic unit sales using US Department of
Agriculture data, we used values for US consumption,
decreased by imports and adjustments (inventory change
and unaccounted for). For market share, we examined the
market share of original participating manufacturers
(OPMs), which were Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard,
and Brown & Williamson. Liggett was excluded from this
analysis since it was not an OPM, but was a subsequent
participating manufacturer (SPM) in the MSA. Companies in
the FTC advertising data were Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds,
Lorillard, Liggett, Brown & Williamson, and Commonwealth
Brands (discount manufacturer). Using data through 1998,
trend lines (shown in figs 2–5) were estimated from an
equation with an intercept and an explanatory variable for
time in years; predicted values were generated for each year,
1999–2002, based on the results. To determine whether the
differences pre- versus post-MSA were significant, we
conducted t tests for the difference between actual and
predicted values and post- versus pre-MSA values.
RESULTS
Financial viability: investments and operating results
Relative to all four indices, investments in tobacco companies
yielded higher returns to stockholders during 1990–2002














































































Figure 1 Investment of $100. In panel
A, the data point for RJ Reynolds is from
March 1991–2002. Sources for both
panels: Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business, NYSE
daily and monthly master/returns file,
1990–2002. Sloan FA, Trogdon JG,
Mathews CA. Litigation and the value of
tobacco companies. Duke University
Working Paper 2004. Yahoo Finance
Research for Russell 2000. http://
finance.yahoo.com [Accessed 14
November 2003].
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tobacco industry by year end 2002 was $360, over $115 (47%)
higher than an index of industries most similar to the tobacco
companies. An equivalent investment in the S&P index
would have yielded $249. The value of a $100 investment in
2002 was $308 for the total market (NASDAQ, AMEX, and
NYSE) and $250 for the small-cap index Russell 2000. The
value of a $100 investment in three tobacco companies
exceeded S&P returns: Philip Morris ($528), Liggett ($898),
and British American Tobacco ($494). For RJ Reynolds, the
value of the investment ($127) was less than the S&P value
during 1991–2002 ($240). Using a four year return for 1999–
2002, an investment in tobacco at the beginning of 1999
yielded $162 by the end of 2002 (from $198 to $360). By
contrast, the same investment in similar industries rose to
$112 by the end of 2002 (from $223 to $245). By contrast,
pre-MSA the increases were higher for the comparison
companies ($100 to $223) than for the tobacco companies
($100 to $198). Returns for all of the other indexes were
negative over this period.
Domestic tobacco revenues increased in 1999 and
remained at a higher level during 1999–2002 than during
the pre-MSA years (1990–1998) (2002 dollars, fig 2). There
was a decline in 2002, which still was above revenue in 1998.
Profits from domestic sales were flat from 1990–98;
immediately after the MSA was reached, such profits rose
to levels prevailing before 1997. During the post-MSA years,
domestic tobacco revenues were above the trend line for
1990–98 projected through 2002. Profit post-MSA was above
the trend line projected from the pre-MSA period.
Declining domestic unit sales and exports
Post-MSA, domestic cigarette unit sales and exports declined
(fig 3). Domestic consumption had been decreasing in the
pre-MSA time period; a larger decline occurred in 1999, from
452 billion to 408 billion units. As would be expected, given
the massive price increases after the MSA was implemented,
in 2002, domestic volume had declined to 390 billion units
and was below the trend projected from 1990–98. Unit
exports decreased during the post-MSA period at a substan-
tially greater rate than predicted from the 1990–98 trend line.
The post-MSA export decline was from 1998–2002. Observed
changes in exports in the post-MSA period reflected the
MSA’s incentives as well as other factors affecting exports.
Market share of OPMs
Participating companies lost share in the total market to
SPMs and NPMs after the MSA was reached (fig 4). The OPM
market share was below the 1995–98 projected trend line
post-MSA. We excluded data before 1995 because of a
substantial increase in OPM share due to the acquisition of
American Brands by British American Tobacco in 1994.
Shifting advertising dollars
Total advertising spending has steadily increased since before
the MSA (2002 dollars) (fig 5). Total advertising expendi-
tures (2002 dollars) increased from $7.4 billion in 1998 to
$11.4 billion in 2001 (54%). Excluding coupons and promo-
tions from total advertising spending, which represented
types of price decreases, real advertising expenditures
decreased post-MSA. However, expenditures less coupons
and promotions were very near the negative projected trend
from 1990–98 data.
DISCUSSION
Overall, from 1999 through 2002, participating manufac-












































Real domestic tobacco profit
Figure 2 Revenue and profit from domestic tobacco sales (1990–
2002). A t test for significance was conducted for revenue and profit for
the following: (1) actual versus predicted for 1999–2002 and (2) actual
pre- versus post-MSA. Revenue: p , 0.001 for both (1) and (2). Profit:
p , 0.001 for (1) and p = 0.68 for (2). Source: Tobacco segment
financial data from 10-K submitted to the US Securities and Exchange
Commission: Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, Lorillard and Liggett, 1990-
2002. Domestic data were available for Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds.
Due to the predominance of revenues in the domestic market for Lorillard
and Liggett as cited in their respective 10-K reports, the total domestic














































Figure 3 Sales in units: domestic and exports (1990–2002). A t test for
significance was conducted for revenue and profit for the following: (1)
actual versus predicted for 1999-2002 and (2) actual pre- versus post-
MSA. Domestic: p = 0.004 for (1) and p , 0.001 for (2). Exports
p , 0.001 for both (1) and (2). Sources: Capehart, T. Tobacco outlook.
Washington DC: United States Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service, TBS-254; 23 April 2003. Capehart T. Tobacco
outlook. Washington DC: United States Department of Agriculture,













1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
OPMs
Figure 4 Share of total market: original participating manufacturers
(1995–2002). A t test for significance was conducted for revenue and
profit for the following: (1) actual versus predicted for 1999–2002 and
(2) actual pre- versus post-MSA. Market share: p = 0.04 for (1) and
p = 0.03 for (2). Sources: Maxwell Jr JC. Maxwell Report. Tobacco
Reporter January 1991:28; March 1992:18–19; March 1993:12–13;
March 1994:14–15; March 1995:12–13; March 1996:16–17; April
1997:22–28; May 1998:22–26; May 1999:22–32; October 2000:18–
24; May 2001:22–28; September 2002:38–44; September 2003:28–
36.
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investor stock returns and profit from domestic tobacco sales.
However, these companies lost market share to SPMs and
NPMs. Also, the decline in exports was not anticipated based
on incentives of the MSA.
Prices of equity in a firm reflect investors’ expectations
about the discounted value of future profits and the degree of
uncertainty associated with these future cash flows. In
settling the state litigation against the companies, the MSA
increased the certainty of future profits, which risk adverse
investors would value.
Several features of the MSA also potentially contributed to
the companies’ future profitability. First, the MSA may have
facilitated collusion in price. Experiencing a common ‘‘cost
shock’’ from theMSA payment obligation, the companies could
raise their selling prices of cigarettes with less fear of price
cutting from theirmajor competitors or from anti-trust scrutiny.
Forward shifting is likely to be stronger in response to a federal
(like theMSA) than to a state excise tax increase since there is a
potential for cross border shopping for the latter.11
Second, given the addictive nature of cigarettes, Becker
and Murphy explained that demand for cigarettes by persons
who remained smokers after the price increase would
plausibly be less price responsive.12 Becker and Murphy
argued that in response to a cigarette tax increase, tobacco
companies raise price by more than the tax increase to obtain
maximum profit from smokers who are already addicted.
Given the industry’s oligopolistic structure, national settle-
ments involving the entire industry like the MSA can lead to
an increase in profits in the industry.8 13 The MSA makes
payments from tobacco companies a function of number of
cigarette packs sold by the tobacco companies. In this sense,
the MSA payment structure resembles an excise tax. With
this market structure, firms optimally shift excise taxes
forward to consumers. Price increases by more than the
amount of the tax.14–17 Although higher excise taxes may
cause higher tobacco company profits in the short run, in the
longer run, profits may be expected to decline as the higher
prices discourage young persons from initiating the habit.18 or
premium producers lose market share.
If the MSA payments were imposed as an unanticipated
lump sum penalty rather than as a payment per unit of
domestic sales, the payments would have been borne by
company owners. As structured, the MSA allowed for
overshifting of payment in the form of substantial price
increases. Although structuring the penalty as a lump sum
obligation would have placed the burden on the owners of
the companies, if the state attorneys general had not accepted
a payment per unit formula, settlement negotiations may
have stalled, with added litigation cost for both sides of the
dispute, and with the added possibility that the states would
have lost at trial.
The penalty for 1999 amounted to $0.40 per pack,19
including the cost of the four individual state settlements
that were no part of the MSA. But price per pack rose by
$0.73 between 1998 and 1999, a 29.7% increase for the year,
most of which occurred in the month immediately following
the MSA.9 20 The value of coupons and promotions also rose
by $0.09 per pack, but net, there still was an increase of $0.64
in the per pack price of cigarettes in the USA.20 21 As a result,
the companies remained profitable.
The fact that settlement discussions were widely known
before the MSA implies that the MSA was not totally
unanticipated by investors. To the extent that the payment
was anticipated by investors in advance of November 1998,
one would expect these anticipations to be reflected in bid
prices for the equity in these companies. In fact, on the day
the MSA was reached, stock prices of these companies
surged, only to fall below the prices prevailing the day before
the settlement on the next day.10
The counterfactuals in our calculations were performance
of a diversified portfolio of equity in major companies
(represented by a weighted index of similar companies, the
S&P 500, the small-cap Russell 2000, and a total market
index). Actual performance of individual stocks may have
differed for many reasons, and we cannot eliminate the
possibility that the value of these companies would have
increased even more if the litigation leading to the MSA had
not occurred.
But at least ex post, investors in the tobacco companies do
not seem to have been harmed in a major way. Investments
in tobacco companies were relatively profitable considering
the periods 1990–2002 and 1999–2002. If tobacco company
stock returns remain higher than those in other industries,
then investors can be expected to continue providing capital
to these firms.
Revenues from domestic sales of tobacco products
increased after the MSA was reached, and profits from this
source increased as well. Although overall domestic con-
sumption of cigarettes decreased,22 the cigarette price
increases more than offset such declines. These price
increases reduced the market share of OPMs as price
sensitive smokers moved to cheaper discount brands. Price
increases reduced overall consumption, but also stimulated
demand for these brands.23 24 The OPMs consequently lost
market share to SPMs and NPMs, which primarily market
discount brands. This shift is plausible in view of the
substantial increase in cigarette prices. Elasticity of demand
estimates in the literature25 are for the industry as a whole.
Elasticities of demand for particular companies are likely to
be substantially higher than the industry elasticity of
demand. For this reason, the long run effect of the MSA
over a decade or more may be less favourable to the
companies than was the effect during the first four post-
MSA years.
The reduction in the overall domestic consumption of
cigarettes represents a success of the MSA.24 Domestic
cigarette units had been decreasing, but a steeper decline







































Total minus coupons 
and promotions
Figure 5 Advertising expenditures with and without coupons and
promotions (1990–2001). A t test for significance was conducted for
revenue and profit for the following: (1) actual versus predicted for
1999–2002 and (2) actual pre- versus post-MSA. Total: p = 0.05 for
(1) and p = 0.03 for (2). Total minus coupons and promotions:
p = 0.20 for (1) and p = 0.02 for (2). Retail value added is defined by
the Federal Trade Commission as ‘‘all expenditures and costs associated
with the value added to the purchase of cigarettes, including buy one get
one free and buy one get x (promotional item) free’’. This category is
combined with coupons in the data with coupons being defined as ‘‘all
costs associated with coupons for the reduction of the retail cost of
cigarettes, whether redeemed at the point of sale or by mail’’.
Promotional allowances are defined as ‘‘allowances paid to retailers and
any other persons (other than full time employees of the cigarette
manufacturers) in order to facilitate the sale of any cigarette’’. Source:
US Federal Trade Commission. Federal Trade Commission Cigarette
Report for 2001. Washington DC: Federal Trade Commission, 2003.
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assure the financial viability of the major US tobacco
manufacturers by increasing their profitability, in leading to
lower cigarette consumption, higher cigarette prices have
important public health benefits in their own right. Because
the MSA did not regulate exports, manufacturers might have
shifted their focus from domestic consumption to an
increased presence in foreign markets through higher levels
of exports.26 But exports declined post-MSA.
One reason is theoretical. Companies may be expected
to profit maximise in both domestic and foreign markets.
Any effect that the MSA has on profitability domestically
should not generally affect decisions in foreign markets.
However, in the short run, companies facing a decreased
domestic demand may have had excess manufacturing
capacity. Considering the short run marginal cost of
cigarette manufacturing, there may have been a temporary
incentive to boost sales to other countries. But this assumes
that (1) the short run marginal cost curve for cigarette
manufacturing is positively sloped, reflecting capacity con-
straints and (2) other countries were not also implement-
ing tobacco control strategies. Given that there was no surge
in demand before the date the MSA was implemented,
it seems unlikely that the companies faced meaningful
capacity constraints at that time. There was a decrease in
cigarette use in some worldwide markets, in part due to
implementation of additional tobacco controls (particularly
in Europe).27 28
But globally, cigarette consumption continues to increase,
in terms of amount of smokers and numbers of cigarettes.29
Also, for reasons unrelated to the MSA, the offshore strategy
of US manufacturers is shifting cigarette production to
foreign countries, which has reduced demand for exports.
Tobacco companies have moved production offshore to take
advantage of cheaper labour.29 30
To deal with exports, international regulation is required,
as is now being attempted by the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control treaty.2 While it seems very unlikely that the
MSA led to an increase in cigarette consumption in other
countries, the negotiations preceding the MSA might have
provided a format for discussing export issues.
To remain competitive, participating manufacturers used
promotional deals, which in turn resulted in an increase in
advertising and promotional expenditures. Discounting
methods used by participating companies included lower
invoice prices, promotions to retailers participating in
manufacturer programs (for example, ‘‘Retail Leaders for
Marlboro’’), price reductions for wholesalers (allowing
retailers to offer rebates to smokers) and buy-one-get-one-
free deals.31–33 Both RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris continued
to spend heavily on promotions to compete with discount
brands, and in some cases reduced workforce in response to
the low prices of discount manufacturers.34 35 Such discount-
ing practices are not reflected in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) for tobacco products which rose substantially immedi-
ately after the MSA was reached and has continued to rise
relative to the overall CPI subsequently—partly reflecting
state excise tax increases implemented since 1998.36
Some pre-MSA strategies, such as brand sponsorships,
were severely restricted or eliminated by the agreement.
Advertising dollars once targeted to billboards and sponsored
special events were now allocated to point of purchase
advertising and promotions at retail stores, practices not
strictly regulated by the MSA.37–44 Even with MSA restric-
tions, youth exposure to cigarette advertising in magazines is
still an issue.42
Overall, the participating companies have lost market share
since 1998. Even with increased coupons and promotions, the
OPMs’ price increased notably. A decreased OPM market
share was not anticipated by those who envisioned that the
MSA would make entry more difficult, for one, because of the
new advertising restrictions.
Other potential factors that may have contributed to
changes in the tobacco industry in the post-MSA period
included legal decisions and other announcements that
reported favourable impacts to the tobacco companies.
Holding other factors constant, including announcements
unanticipated by investors through 2003, one study found
that the cost of capital to the companies fell post-MSA.43 The
decreased cost of capital reflected lower (non-diversiable)
risk from investments in tobacco companies that may reflect
decreased volatility of profit due to their increased pricing
power at least over the short and intermediate term.
Conclusion
Increasingly, litigation is being used to improve the public’s
health.44 Lessons learned from the MSA experience can also
be used in the ongoing US Department of Justice lawsuit
against tobacco companies for their alleged conspiracy to
mislead the public about health risks.45 46 Fast food compa-
nies are increasingly feeling public pressure for causing
obesity, and are becoming subject to lawsuits for such
reasons as misleading advertisements and targeting market-
ing efforts to children, two areas of emphasis in the tobacco
litigation.47 This suggests that the MSA experience may be of
more than historical relevance. The MSA did not eliminate
cigarette use of the companies that manufacture them. The
MSA was never intended nor expected to destroy the tobacco
industry. But neither was it intended to improve company
finances nor create stakeholders newly dependent on their
continued financial success.
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